ANC Coalition Deal Could Trigger Economic and Financial Reversal
Bheki Mahlobo
– November 18, 2026
6 min read

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If the African National Congress (ANC) concludes a coalition agreement with ActionSA, the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP), the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the Patriotic Alliance (PA), and other smaller parties, and that agreement results in the Democratic Alliance (DA) leaving the Government of National Unity (GNU), the economic consequences for South Africa could be severe.
The greatest danger would arise if the collapse of the GNU was accompanied by a shift towards economic policies hostile to private investment. Examples would include an accelerated drive towards expropriation, nationalising private healthcare, nationalising private pension funds, and the ratcheting up of race-based business licensing and procurement regulations. Under those circumstances, South Africa could enter a self-reinforcing cycle of falling business confidence, declining fixed investment, weaker economic growth, deteriorating public finances, rising borrowing costs, and increasing political instability.
The first casualty would likely be business confidence. The departure of the DA, particularly if accompanied by policies that undermine property rights, fiscal discipline, and private enterprise, would signal to investors that South Africa was moving in a less favourable economic direction. Businesses could respond by delaying expansion, reducing capital expenditure, and reconsidering future investments.
The chart below shows that business confidence reached 80 points in 2007, meaning that the overwhelming majority of surveyed businesses were satisfied with prevailing conditions. By the second quarter of 2026, confidence had fallen to just 39 points. Consumer confidence had similarly deteriorated from levels above 20 points before 2008 to negative 19 points in the second quarter of 2026.

The relationship between confidence and investment is important.
The chart below shows that South Africa’s fixed investment rate rose from 15.0% of GDP in 1994 to 21.6% in 2008, before declining to just 13.9% in 2025. That represents a fall of 7.7 percentage points, equivalent to 35.6% of the 2008 investment rate. South Africa now invests approximately ten percentage points less of its GDP than its emerging-market peers.

A further deterioration in confidence could push investment even lower, undermining the construction of factories, infrastructure, machinery, and other productive capacity on which future economic growth depends.
The consequences for economic growth would follow. The chart below shows that between 2004 and 2007, South Africa sustained annual growth rates averaging more than 5.0%, supported by rising investment. Over the past 17 years, however, growth has averaged just 1.1%. A further decline in investment would make even that weak performance difficult to sustain.

The employment consequences could be substantial. The chart below shows how between 1994 and 2008, the number of employed South Africans rose from approximately eight million to nearly 15 million, an increase of almost seven million jobs. In the 17 years that followed, employment increased by only about two million as economic growth stagnated.

Unemployment, which fell to approximately 21.0% in 2007, had risen above 30.0% by 2026. Manufacturing, one of the economy’s most important sources of employment for less-skilled workers, has seen its share of GDP fall from approximately 21.0% in 1995 to just 12.0%.
A renewed investment decline would threaten to deepen these trends, further limiting opportunities for millions of unemployed South Africans.
The consequences for public finances would follow. Slower economic growth would weaken corporate profits, household incomes, and consumer spending, reducing the government’s receipts from corporate income tax, personal income tax, and value-added tax.
South Africa’s fiscal position is already strained. The chart below shows government and expenditure levels as a share of GDP since 1994. Government revenue stands at approximately 28.0% of GDP, against expenditure of about 33.0%, with the budget deficit estimated at 4.7% of GDP, equivalent to approximately R363.4 billion.

If economic growth weakened further while the new coalition increased public expenditure, the deficit could widen substantially. The government would be forced either to borrow more, increase taxation, or reduce expenditure, each of which could further undermine economic performance.
Slower growth would also make the public debt burden more difficult to stabilise. When government debt increases faster than the economy’s capacity to generate revenue, debt-service obligations consume an increasing share of public resources.
Financial markets could respond to these developments well before their consequences became apparent in official economic data.
The chart below shows that after the formation of the GNU in 2024, the differential between South African and equivalent United States government bond yields narrowed to approximately four percentage points, approaching levels last seen between 2004 and 2007, when South Africa was growing at approximately 5.0% annually and its public finances were considerably stronger.

Those market levels suggest that investors have been pricing in expectations of political stability, fiscal discipline, and economic reform that may not survive the collapse of the GNU.
If investors conclude that the government is abandoning those objectives, bond prices could fall sharply as yields rise. The government’s borrowing costs would increase, placing further pressure on the budget.
Higher bond yields would create a second fiscal problem. As existing government debt matures and is refinanced at higher interest rates, debt-service costs would rise. A growing share of government revenue would therefore be diverted away from infrastructure, healthcare, education, and other public services towards interest payments.
The rand would also be vulnerable. A withdrawal of foreign capital from South African financial markets could weaken the currency, increasing the domestic cost of imported fuel, machinery, and other goods.
Higher import prices would increase inflationary pressures, complicating the task of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). Even if economic growth weakened, the Bank could find itself unable to reduce interest rates because of currency instability and rising inflation expectations.
Under more severe circumstances, it could even be forced to raise rates to contain inflation, further increasing borrowing costs for households and businesses.
South Africa could therefore face the particularly damaging combination of weak economic growth, rising inflation, and elevated interest rates.
The longer-term consequences for internal stability would be equally serious. Weak growth means fewer jobs and limited improvements in household incomes. Deteriorating public finances would constrain the government’s ability to maintain services and expand social support, while rising unemployment and declining living standards would increase the likelihood of public protest and political instability.
The extent of the damage would depend on the policies ultimately adopted and whether institutions such as the National Treasury and the SARB retained their credibility and independence. But the political coalition now being assembled would be hostile to such independence with the assumption that that independence will be eroded over time, thereby reducing credibility. Accompanied by a decisive shift towards policies hostile to private investment, the consequences could reinforce one another.
Falling confidence undermines investment, weaker investment reduces growth, slower growth weakens tax revenue, deteriorating public finances increase borrowing costs, and rising unemployment would intensify political instability.
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